Brodsky v. FBI (7th Cir.) -- affirming district’s court decision that FBI properly relied on Exemptions 3, 6, 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E) to withhold certain records concerning requester’s status as a confidential informant, as well to support agency’s Glomar response; declining to change the Circuit’s standard of review in FOIA cases, which calls for de novo review as to whether there was “an adequate factual basis to make a legally sound decision,” and then clear error review of “the court’s conclusions that the documents were properly withheld or redacted under the exemptions”; rejecting requester’s argument that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to eliminate Chevron deference in Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) affects the weight a court may give to declarations made by agency officials in a FOIA case.
Gage v. EEOC (9th Cir.) (unpublished) -- affirming district court’s decision that agency properly issued an Exemption 3 Glomar response and that requests for “Gage’s charge file . . . were moot because the EEOC produced all non-exempt documents; further ruling that district court did not abuse its discretion by denying discovery.
Carlborg v. Dep't of Navy (S.D. Cal.) -- in case concerning records of plaintiff’s involuntary discharge from the military, determining that: (1) plaintiff’s FOIA claims arising from one batch of requests were precluded under the doctrine of res judicata, but that other claims were not; and (2) government established that it performed adequate searches in response to plaintiff’s multiple requests, and that the Navy was not required to create screenshots of records already produced to plaintiff; and (3) government properly relied on Exemption 6 to withhold the names, social security numbers, telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, military rank, and signatures of third parties and government employees
Moslem v. DOJ (D.D.C.) -- denying pro se inmate’s recusal motion because plaintiff’s claims of bias merely boiled down to allegations of judicial mistakes, which falls short of the disqualification standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 455; ruling that plaintiff did not have standing to challenge Tax Division’s response to a request identified in plaintiff’s Complaint, because the request was not submitted by plaintiff or by anyone claiming it was submitted on plaintiff’s behalf; and denying plaintiff’s various other requests for relief on both procedural grounds and on the merits.
Summaries of all published opinions issued in 2025 are available here. Earlier opinions are available for 2024 and from 2015 to 2023.
